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SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A public high school gym teacher, acting without a search
warrant, searched the defendant student's gym bag and
found a small quantity of marijuana. The trial court denied a
motion to suppress the marijuana and the Louisiana Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that a public school teacher is a
state agent subject to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements of the fourth amendment' and the Louisiana con-
stitution.2 State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975). 3
The protection afforded a minor student by the fourth
amendment is perhaps open to some speculation due to his
age and the unique situation presented by the school envi-
ronment. While the amendment has never been applied spec-
ifically to minors, the construction given to other Bill of
Rights guarantees supports extending to minors the protec-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
2. La. Const. art. I § 7 (1921), in effect at the time of the search, provided:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no such search or seizure shall be made except upon warrant therefor issued
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." This
guarantee is now found at LA. CONST. art. I § 5.
3. Upon granting petition for writ of certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the decision for clarification of the
grounds used in reaching the decision. 423 U.S. 809 (1975). The Louisiana
Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that the decision was based on both
federal and state constitutional grounds and state statutory law. 330
So. 2d 900 (La. 1976). The four-member majority included three of the
same justices in the majority of the original decision. Justice Barham, who
wrote the original majority opinion, had resigned in the interim and his
successor authored the decision on remand. The decision on remand almost
certainly bars a hearing by the United States Supreme Court. In remanding
the decision to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the United States Supreme
Court cited California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), involving a similar clar-
ification order that resulted in denial of rehearing at 409 U.S. 1068 (1972),
after the state court held the decision was based on both federal and state
constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (The
Court will not review judgments of state courts resting on adequate and
independent state grounds.). Both Justice Summers and Chief Justice' San-
ders in their separate dissenting opinions in the decision on remand recog-
nize the likelihood that the remand decision creates a barrier to further
review by the United States Supreme Court.
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tion of the fourth amendment as well. For example, in In re
Gault,4 the United States Supreme Court held that minors
subjected to juvenile proceedings are entitled to procedural
due process safeguards including adequate notice of charges, 5
the right to counsel,6 protection against self-incrimination, 7
and the right to confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses.8 In addition, Gault provides the most comprehensive
statement of the application of the Bill of Rights to minors in
the broad declaration of the Court that "neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."9 Further support for the federal constitutional rights
of minor students is found in the language of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School Districtl° that neither "students
[n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 1 The more
recent decision of Goss v. Lopez12 expands the concept of stu-
dents' rights by requiring an informal hearing before suspen-
sion for ten days or less in order to meet due process require-
ments. i s
While Gault, Tinker, and Goss provide adequate support
for the application of the fourth amendment protection to a
minor student, the standards applied are not necessarily
equivalent to those applied to adults; all three cases recog-
nize the competing interest of the state in protecting the
minor and require less stringent protection than that af-
forded adults.14 Other cases weighing the same conflicting
interests have recognized the existence of the minor's con-
stitutional rights but held that the state's interest in the
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Id. at 33.
6. Id. at 35.
7. Id. at 55.
8. Id. at 56.
9. Id. at 13.
10. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11. Id. at 506.
12. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
13. Justice Powell, dissenting, recognizes that the decision analogizes the
rights of students in elementary and secondary schools to the rights of
adults. 419 U.S. 584, 591 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. Gault applied the essentials of due process without requiring confor-
mity with all the requirements of a criminal trial; the hearing requirements
of Goss do not, for example, require the presence of an attorney; Tinker
applies first amendment rights while emphasizing the authority of the state
and school officials to maintain control in the schools.
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minor's protection outweighs the protection afforded the
minor by the right.' 5
Although the fourth amendment' 6 and the exclusionary
rule 7 have been held applicable to the states, imposition of
the exclusionary rule will not lie unless the search is un-
reasonable and made by a person classified as a state agent. 8
Thus, courts facing factual situations similar to that in Mora
have allowed use of the questioned evidence by noting the
absence of one or both of these requirements. 19 Some courts
have relied on the doctrine of in loco parentis, based on a
presumed delegation of parental authority to the teacher, to
deny the teacher state agent status and avoid suppression of
the evidence. 20 Use of the doctrine by a Texas Court of Appeals
in Mercer v. State 2' represents an extreme example of this
15. Ginsberg v. State, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944).
16. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703 incorpo-
rates the Mapp rule and provides in pertinent part: "A. A defendant ag-
grieved by an unconstitutional search or seizure may move to suppress, for
use as evidence at the trial on the merits, any tangible objects or other
property, or documents, books, papers or other writings, on the ground that
they were so obtained." For an argument that an exclusionary rule is implicit
in LA. CONST. art. I § 5, see Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1974). Justice Dixon
notes in Mora, No. 54,884, La. Sup. Ct., March 29, 1976, that the exclusionary
rule was embodied in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703 at the time of the search and
is now contained in LA. CONST. art. I § 5.
18. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (Fruits of an illegal search
conducted by a private individual are not subject to the Mapp rule.). For an
excellent discussion encouraging extension of the exclusionary rule to pri-
vate searches and seizures, see Note, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314 (1967). See Har-
grave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA.
L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1974), for a discussion of the possibility that LA. CONST. art. I
§ 5 does not limit the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through state
action.
19. See, e.g., In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App.
1973); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Ct. App. 1972); In re G.,
11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1970); In re Donaldson, 269
Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971). Cf. People v. Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.S.2d
783 (Crim. Ct. 1973).
20. See, e.g., In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Juv. Ct. 1972);
People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. T. 1971), aff'd 30
N.Y.2d 734, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167, 284 N.E.2d 153 (1972); People v. Stewart, 63
Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970); Ranninger v. State, 460 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
21. 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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reasoning as the court claims that teachers have "plenary
parental power over pupils while in school," 22 and concludes
that the teacher could not have acted for the state while
acting in loco parentis. The fallacy inherent in this fiction of
the teacher as the parents' replacement is that the parents,
but not the teacher, could have searched and remained silent
with no legal requirement to report the crime.23
In contrast, both the majority24 and the dissent 2 5 in Mora
reach the correct conclusion by avoiding the use of the doc-
trine to determine whether the teacher was a state agent;
both characterized the teacher as a state agent based upon
his function and strict accountability to the state. Although
both Louisiana 26 and common law jurisdictions 27 recognize
the existence of the doctrine, it was never meant to extend to
the realm of criminal conduct.28 Further, in a system of com-
pulsory education, 29 the fiction of parental authorization or
delegation formerly implied from the parents' sending the
child to the educational institution is greatly weakened. 30
22. Id. at 717.
23. Id. at 721 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
24. 307 So. 2d at 319.
25. 307 So. 2d at 323.
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 220 provides: "Fathers and mothers may, during
their life, delegate a part of their authority to teachers, schoolmasters and
others to whom they entrust their children for their education, such as the
power of restraint and correction, so far as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which they employ them. They have also the right to bind their
children as apprentices."
27. 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 452-53 (G. Sharswood ed. 1860)
states: "He [father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz., that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed." See, e.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Wexell v. Scott, 2 Ill. App. 3d
646, 276 N.E.2d 735 (Ct. App. 1971).
28. "The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it
was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the
purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child. But
there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence." In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
29. E.g., LA. R.S. 17:221 (Supp. 1966).
30. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Con-
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In addition to public school teachers' own state employ-
ment and consequent duty to carry out state policy, 3 1 their
frequent connections with the police in search situations sub-
stantiate the argument that teachers are acting as state
agents. Teachers are often trained by local police in methods
of detection and identification of marijuana;32 in Mora the
school's "drug coordinator" was called to identify the sub-
stance found by the gym teacher.2 3 Furthermore, factual
situations in many cases involving teacher searches indicate
that police are called immediately or even assigned to and
waiting outside the school.3 4 Such close connections between
school officials and the police culminating in the teacher's
delivery of the evidence to the police constitutes a relation-
ship similar to that between state and federal officials disap-
proved in Elkins v. United States,3 5 which held inadmissible
evidence obtained by state officials in a manner which would
have required exclusion if the evidence had been obtained by
federal officials.
Although the language of the fourth amendment man-
dates that the warrant shall issue "upon probable cause,"
warrantless searches and warrants issued on a showing of
less than the traditional probable cause have received judi-
cial sanction in certain narrowly defined circumstances. 36
stitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 559-62 (1971). See Board of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which recognized the effect of compulsory at-
tendance in distinguishing the infringement upon the religious liberty of
those voluntarily attending college from a similar infringement on students
in public high schools.
31. LA. R.S. 17:416 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 194, § 1; La.
Acts 1970, No. 306, § 1; La. Acts. 1974, No. 683, § 1; La. Acts 1975, No. 216, § 1.
32. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 788 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Buss]. Training
programs in detection of narcotics are available to teachers in East Baton
Rouge Parish upon request of school principals. Telephone interview with
Sergeant Welborn of the Baton Rouge City Police Dept., April 13, 1976.
33. 307 So. 2d at 321.
34. See, e.g., In re Boykin, 39 11. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968). In East
Baton Rouge Parish public schools, city police officers are assigned to the
schools as school liaison officers to facilitate police contact with the schools.
Telephone interview with Sergeant Welborn of the Baton Rouge City Police
Dept., April 13, 1976.
35. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
36. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (stop and frisk for weapons al-
lowed without probable cause); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (administrative search for housing code violations could establish
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While the cases carefully limit the instances in which
searches will be permitted and in some instances restrict the
scope of the permissible search, 37 some courts see justification
for use of a lesser standard in the school context, finding
"special circumstances" which justify balancing the needs of
the school for discipline and order against the students' right
to full fourth amendment protection."8 The Mora dissent pro-
vides an excellent example of this type of reasoning as Justice
Summers determines that a standard of "reasonable suspi-
cion" would best meet the conflicting goals of control for the
school and privacy for the student. 39
In accordance with the theory that a stringent probable
cause standard need not be applied, the fourth amendment
warrant requirement has rarely been applied to public school
searches.40 Without any attempt to meet the "specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions" '4 1 to the warrant
requirement, those courts that even discuss the requirement
almost unanimously reject the necessity of a warrant as an
unnecessary inconvenience and distraction.42 The inconve-
nience, however, must be weighed against the cost to students'
probable cause with little difficulty); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d
805 (9th Cir. 1967) (border searches do not require warrant issued upon
probable cause). For a discussion of the application of the fourth amendment
to airport searches, see Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 860 (1974).
37. Terry allows only a frisk of the person for "the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." 392 U.S. at 26.
38. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); People
v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. T. 1971); In re G.C., 121 N.J.
Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Juv. Ct. 1972).
39. 307 So. 2d at 324. Courts using in loco parentis in these instances
reason that this special position makes the teacher's interference more
reasonable. See Buss at 744.
40. See People v. Bowers, 72 Misic. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Crim. Ct.
1973). The role of the school's security guard in searching the defendant
student distinguishes Bowers from the Mora situation in which the teacher
was alone in searching and was still subject to the warrant requirement.
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Some of these "excep-
tions" include: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (in "hot pursuit"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(exigent circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigent
circumstances-search of automobile).
42. See, e.g., In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (App. Ct.
1970).
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fourth amendment rights. 43 In Camara v. Municipal Court,4 4
the United States Supreme Court weighed the needs of the
city in searching for violations of the city housing code with
the citizens' rights to be protected from unreasonable search
and seizure and held that, despite the inconvenience, these
administrative searches required a warrant. In Goss v.
Lopez, 45 the Court found an informal hearing and a written
notice prerequisites for a ten-day suspension from public
school despite protests of administrative inconvenience by
school officials. 46 Both cases imposed such stringent pro-
cedural safeguards even in the absence of a search for crimi-
nal evidence; when criminal evidence is the object of a search,
the argument for the necessity of a warrant is even more
compelling.
Faced with the difficult question of the application of the
probable cause and warrant requirements in the "special cir-
cumstances" of the public school, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Mora clearly rejects the attempt to except public
school teachers' searches from the traditional standards. Un-
doubtedly, the enforcement by the court of the warrant re-
quirement in a search by a public school teacher will require
changes in the administrative procedure of the Louisiana
public school system.4 7 However, the dire consequences pre-
dicted by the dissent 48 seem exaggerated. The narrow holding
of Mora does not encompass administrative searches 49 con-
43. Buss at 744.
44. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
46. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969): "In
order for the State in person of the school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id. at 509.
47. An interesting question that may be raised as a result of Mora is the
possibility of parental consent to the search of the minor. Because the stu-
dent himself is protected by the fourth amendment, the success of such a
delegation is doubtful even outside reliance on in loco parentis.
48. "Here, the majority has fastened upon the school officials of our state
an onerous search warrant requirement at a time when violence and law-
lessness in some of our schools are acute." State v. Mora, 330 So. 2d 900, 903
(La. 1976) (Sanders, C. J., dissenting).
49. See Buss at 754-55. In assessing the role of Camara in school
searches, Buss outlines four categories to distinguish an administrative search
from a search for criminal evidence: (1.) The general inspection for cleanli-
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ducted in the schools but only searches for evidence of crimi-
nal conduct. The decision does not mean that teachers may no
longer search even for evidence of a criminal violation; it
means only that compliance with the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the fourth amendment must be assured.
Kay Cowden Medlin
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE "JOHN DOE" SUMMONSES ON BANKS
A routine report from the Federal Reserve Bank to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1970 noted the receipt of
two $20,000 deposits of deteriorated $100 bills from another
bank.1 In an investigation of that transaction, the IRS issued
a "John Doe" summons, 2 directed to the bank which received
the money originally, to learn its source.3 The Sixth Circuit,
noting that the IRS lacked authority to summon a third party
bank's records except in an investigation of a specified tax-
payer, reversed the district court order of compliance with
the summons. 4 The government appealed, and the United
States Supreme Court held that the IRS has authority under
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 7601-025 to issue, pursuant to a
ness of lockers; no particular student is singled out in advance; a minor
sanction or no sanction for failing to meet the prescribed standards. (2.)
Search for evidence of violation of a school regulation for which a sanction
such as expulsion may be imposed; focus is on one student. (3.) Search for
evidence of a violation of a school regulation which is, in substance, also a
criminal violation. (4.) Search undertaken not to enforce a school rule, but to
obtain evidence that a student has committed a criminal offense.
1. The deterioration suggested a long period of storage, triggering the
IRS's interest in whether the related transactions had been reported for tax
purposes. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 142-43 (1975).
2. Commonly refers to a summons directed to a third party seeking
disclosure of information as to, or the identity of, some unknown taxpayer(s).
3. Originally the IRS sought whatever records would provide informa-
tion on the source of the money. The receiving bank refused to comply, and
the Service applied for enforcement in federal district court under INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 7604. To avoid unnecessary disclosures, the court narrowed
the request to all slips showing cash deposits of $20,000 or of $5,000 or more
involving $100 bills for the pertinent one-month period. United States v.
Bisceglia, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 9474 (E.D. Ky. 1972) (memorandum opinion).
4. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7601 provides: "The secretary or his delegate
1074 [Vol. 36
